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ABSTRACT 
Land grabbing is a serious issue in Cambodia, where land concessions covered 
approximately 65 percent of the total arable land in 2013. Because of the 
36,000-hectare land concession in the Botum Sakor National Park granted by the 
Cambodian government to a Chinese company, more than 1,400 primarily fishing 
families have been relocated to new villages built inland, approximately 20 km from 
the coast. Using a case study research design, this paper provides a unique glimpse 
into the lives of those relocated by assessing their living conditions, livelihoods, 
food security, housing and access to basic services approximately four years after 
the relocation. The results show that those affected by the land concession are worse 
off than they were before the relocation and will likely remain so in the short to 
medium term. They have lost their livelihoods, their food and nutrition security have 
worsened, and their access to both health services and education is problematic. 
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The roads and houses in the relocation sites are poorly built. There are limited water 
sources in the relocation villages, and the water does not meet the national standards 
for drinking water. Although some families did find jobs with the investment project, 
they were concerned about its long-term prospects. 
Keywords: Large-scale land concessions, land grabbing, relocation, food security, 
Cambodia.
INTRODUCTION 
Land grabbing is a serious issue in Cambodia. The 2007–2008 global financial 
and food price crises and the growing demand for energy increased land 
investment by transnational corporations, international financial institutions, 
foreign governments, local business elites and other investors in developing 
countries, including Cambodia (De Schutter 2011; Deininger 2011; UNDESA 
2010), the land appropriation, often combined with forced evictions, had 
already been occurring in Cambodia since late 1990s. Other factors such 
as Asian money laundering and elite capture have driven land grabbing in 
Cambodia (Baird 2014). However, the consequences for small-holding 
farmers and indigenous people are same, regardless of who is responsible or 
what the driving forces for the land dispossession are; whether an investment 
was made to feed people in another country or escape the vulnerabilities of the 
stock market—issues identified as part of the global land grab meta-narrative; 
by Chinese companies investing in logging or building hotels, casinos and 
housing complexes; or, as described by the Cambodia Daily, the Vietnamese 
military assuming control of border areas inhabited by indigenous people 
(Blomberg and Roeun 2015).
Alliances among foreign investors, local business elite and state 
officials have enabled opportunities to be seized for appropriating resources 
and land grabbing in times of open markets and high indebtedness in 
developing countries (White et al. 2012). The governments of the Global 
South claim to sell land or provide long-term land leases or concessions to 
boost national economic growth and government revenue, promote agriculture 
intensification and agro-processing, for job creation, to increase export or to 
attract foreign direct investment (Cotula et al. 2009). Cambodian Land Law 
codifies land concessions1 as a mechanism for the government to grant state 
land for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploitation (RGC 2005). The 
Cambodian government considers granting economic land concessions to 
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private companies as its major strategy for economic development with the 
aim of (RGC 2014):
1. Developing an intensive agricultural base and promoting capital investment 
in industrial-agriculture;
2. Increasing employment opportunities in rural areas, intensifying and 
diversifying livelihood opportunities and natural resource management; and 
3. Generating revenue from concession fees, taxation and other charges. 
There is frequently an assumption of either an abundancy of land or of the 
existence of idle, marginal, underutilised, fallow or vacant land in countries 
conducting large land deals. However, such land is often utilised by indigenous 
and other rural communities that do not have formal land rights (Borras and 
Franco 2011; Schneider 2011; Scoones et al. 2013; White et al. 2012). Their 
land use rights are often not codified in “modern” law and are non-existent 
in any formal legal terms but are based on local traditions (UNDESA 2010); 
alternatively, in the case of Cambodia, people might have the right to use 
the land based on the existing legislation but have not formalised it. These 
land users are marginalised from formal land rights and access to the law 
and institutions (Cotula et al. 2009). Large-scale land investment often lacks 
transparency and adequate consultation processes and is characterised by 
uneven access to information and failure to implement the domestic legal 
framework, which is often relatively well developed on paper, resulting in 
widespread conflict over land ownership and use and in the marginalisation of 
the affected communities (Cotula et al. 2009; Schneider 2011; Subedi 2014; 
UNHRC 2012). 
The land concessions have major potential consequences for both 
economies and livelihoods (Scoones et al. 2013). Their social and economic 
impacts on local communities could be disastrous, especially when combined 
with forced evictions, displacement without fair and just compensation or prior 
public consultation, involuntary resettlement or poorly planned relocation 
of people from their homes and farm lands. Loss of land tenure deprives 
vulnerable people of their livelihoods, as a multidisciplinary World Bank team 
showed in 19 case studies from four continents (Deininger 2011). Large-scale 
land investors rarely employ numbers of people equal to those who lose their 
land tenure (UNDESA 2010; Deininger 2011). Most relocation areas do not 
provide affected communities with access to adequate public services and 
infrastructure, health services or schools, as the Forest Peoples Programme 
has documented in cases in Malaysia (Toh 2013) and Cambodia (Khiev 2013). 
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Major environmental problems, ranging from the destruction of forests 
to severe impacts on biodiversity to water resource pollution, result from 
related land use changes. The heavy use of pesticides and chemical fertilisers 
causes water pollution, poisons fish and increases the water shortage problem 
in communities affected by land concessions (Ravanera and Gorra 2011). 
Areas of spiritual and cultural significance for indigenous communities, are 
often encroached or destroyed, as documented empirically in concrete cases 
in Cambodia and Laos by Hanssen (2007), Prachvuthy (2011), and Neef et al. 
(2013). However, if the land concessions are regulated to mitigate negative 
impacts and maximise opportunities and if the projects are well-executed, they 
can generate large benefits that can be shared with local people (Deininger 
2011; Borras et al. 2013).
According to Haakansson et al. (2011), approximately 56 percent of all 
arable land in Cambodia has been given to private companies for agro-industrial 
use, and Khiev (2013) claims that by 2013, such land concessions had already 
covered approximately 65 percent of the total arable land. Although some of 
these lands were gained for speculative purposes and were not developed, the 
communities have been evicted or are under serious threat of eviction and 
dispossession. Land concessions for agro-industrial use and other purposes 
supposedly meant that more than 22 percent of the country’s total surface area 
was in the hands of private investors by the end of 2012 (Khiev 2013) though 
a significant proportion of these were awarded for mining exploration and will 
not be developed further. More than 770,000 Cambodians have been affected 
by land grabs and resulting conflicts over natural resources (ADHOC 2014).
Land grabbing occurs in many different manners based on the specific 
social, environmental, economic, legal and geopolitical circumstances, 
with important regional differences within countries. This paper illustrates 
how the practice of large-scale land concessions impacts local marginalised 
communities in southwestern Cambodia, an area that is largely overlooked by 
researchers due to its relative inaccessibility.  
The research questions were formulated as follows: 
• How have the livelihoods and income-generation opportunities and food and 
nutrition security of communities affected by large-scale land concession 
changed after relocation and compensation? Have the affected communities 
found long-term job opportunities with the land concession project? 
• How have the living standards, including housing and tenure security and 
access to basic services such as education, health care, transportation and 
water/sanitation of the communities affected by large-scale land concession 
changed after the relocation and compensation?
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This paper examines an infamous large-scale land concession in the Botum 
Sakor National Park in Koh Kong province, where the Cambodian government 
granted an economic land concession to Union Development Group (UDG) 
Company Ltd. More than 1,400 families in 12 coastal communities were 
living on the land in question, and most have been relocated to 10 new inland 
villages, approximately 20 km from the coast.
Cambodia: Socio-economic Overview 
Eighty percent of the 15.1 million Cambodian population live in rural areas 
(World Bank 2014) and are dependent on natural resources and subsistence 
farming is the most prevalent form of livelihood. According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2011a, 2011b), 50 percent of the population is 
engaged in fisheries during certain periods of the year, and this sector provides 
approximately 75 percent of the total animal protein intake for the population.
Cambodia has recorded healthy economic growth in recent years and the 
per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity is almost USD3,000 (World 
Bank 2014). Inequality has increased, in part due to the growing concentration 
of productive assets, especially land (USAID 2011). 
Although one quarter of the country’s total area has been recognised as 
protected (World Bank 2014), the rate of deforestation is one of the fastest in 
the world, with an average annual deforestation rate of 2 percent since 1970 
(USAID 2011). Deforestation and the subsequent expansion of permanent 
low-land monocultures have severely disrupted the agro-ecosystem stability 
and affected the landscape-wide environmental stability and resilience (Khiev 
2013).
Table 1: Selected socio-economic indicators. 
Indicator Cambodia
Population (2013 est.) 15.1 Mil.
% Population living in rural areas (2011) 80%
GDP per capita PPP (2012 est.) 3,000 USD
% Labour force in agriculture (2010 est./ 2011) 56%
% Population engaged in fisheries (2011 est.) 50%
Gini coefficient 37.9%
Protected areas (% of country’s total area) 24%
Average annual deforestation rate (1970–2010) 2%
Sources: World Bank (2014), FAO (2011a), USAID (2011).
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Historical and Legal Aspects of Land Tenure in Cambodia
Attempts to introduce formal private land ownership by the French colonial 
administration in the late 1800s and the first half of the 20th century and by 
post-colonial governments were partially successful in the rice-growing plains 
but were largely unsuccessful in upland and forest areas (Sophal and Acharya 
2002). Even where settled agriculture was the norm, the notion of land as 
private property contrasted with traditional ownership practices (Haakansson 
et al. 2011). The Khmer Rouge regime abolished private property in 1975, 
uprooted communities from their traditional lands, destroyed most land 
records and nationalised all the land. Recognition of private ownership of 
land began again only in the mid-1980s (Sophal and Acharya 2002; Engval 
and Kokko 2007; Westeröd 2010). The Land Law introduced in 1992 allowed 
people to apply for land certificates; the land ownership was limited to 0.2 ha 
for housing and possession was restricted to up to five ha agricultural land; 
if such agricultural land was left vacant for more than three years, it reverted 
to state ownership (Sophal and Acharya 2002; Engval and Kokko 2007). At 
the end of the millennium, approximately 70 percent to 80 percent of the total 
rural population possessed agricultural land, but only 1 percent had legal title 
to their land (Boreak 2000). 
The 2001 Land Law provided for more widespread granting of land 
titles; those who occupied and enjoyed uncontested possession of land for at 
least five years prior to 31 August 2001 and met other conditions gained legal 
possession rights that could be transferred to full ownership (RGC 2002). 
However, implementation and enforcement of the law has been problematic. 
According to Westeröd (2010), at the end of the first decade of the third 
millennium only 10 percent of Cambodian land had been officially titled. 
Although significant progress has been made, there are concerns about the 
exclusion of households and communities from land titling (UNHRC 2012). 
The 2001 Land Law recognises five categories of land: private land, state 
public land, state private land, common property and indigenous land. State 
public land cannot be subject to sale, transfer and economic or social land 
concessions. If state public land loses its public interest value, it may become 
state private land through formal re-classification. Such state private land may 
be subject to long-term leases, economic or social land concessions, sales or 
transfers of rights (RGC 2002). The Protected Areas Law, which came into 
force in January 2008, introduced a new zoning system of protected areas to 
effectively manage their conservation and development. They were divided 
into four distinct zones: core zones, conservation zones, sustainable use 
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zones, and community zones. No clearance or building is allowed in the core 
or conservation zones and any development within the sustainable use or 
community zones can only take place with government approval (Subedi 2014). 
The UNHRC (2012) reports that concessions granted to private companies 
within protected areas covered more than 500,000 ha, whereas Khiev (2013) 
specifically recorded 18 economic land concessions covering 272,597 ha.
Land Concessions in Cambodia
Official and publicly available data on land concessions are incomplete and 
are not updated regularly (UNHRC 2012). It is estimated that 3.9 million ha of 
land, equivalent to 22.1 percent of the country’s total area, have been handed 
over to private investment, of which at least 2,657,470 ha was transferred by 
the government to private sector investors by the end of 2012 in more than 300 
land concessions (Khiev 2013; UNHRC 2012). However, official statistics 
on economic land concessions published by the government in June 2012 
listed 117 companies with only 1,181,522 ha from January 1996 to 6 June 
2012 (UNHRC 2012). By 2013, land concessions for plantations of inter alia 
sugarcane, rubber, cassava, acacia, eucalyptus and palm oil under private sector 
investment covered approximately 65 percent of the total arable land (Khiev 
2013). Many of these land concessions have been only partially developed or 
are undeveloped and were motivated by speculative or unproductive purposes 
(Toh 2013; USAID 2011; Löhr 2011). 
Cambodia is prone to weak implementation and enforcement of the 
law; this: 
... made it possible for influential individuals… and groups to acquire 
large landholdings (USAID 2011). 
The Cambodian economy is controlled by a new elitea sprawling network 
of Cambodian People`s Party politicians, military brass and business families 
with patronage to Prime Minister Hun Sen and his close associates (Strangio 
2014). This well-oiled system extends throughout Cambodian society and is 
widely accepted because it is how Cambodians understand the nature of power 
(omnaich), as not only being rich but also being above the law (Jacobsen and 
Stuart-Fox 2013).
The 2001 Land Law stipulates that the maximum size of an economic 
land concession is 10,000 ha, but many times this amount have been granted. 
As Global Witness (2013) reported, Vietnam Rubber Group and affiliated 
companies appear to have been allocated over 16 times the legal limit of land. 
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Some investors circumvent the limit by creating several different companies, 
which is illegal, too. Given the widespread criticism of the implementation of 
Economic Land Concession (ELC) policy, Prime Minister Hun Sen issued a 
moratorium on granting economic land concessions in May 2012 and called for 
a review of the existing land concessions, stating that they would be cancelled 
for companies that fail to comply with applicable procedures and contracts 
or that conduct illegal logging, encroach on land outside the land concession 
or leave the land vacant for resale (Subedi 2014). However, land concessions 
were granted even after this moratorium, with the justification that these leases 
were already being processed when the moratorium was declared; Khiev 
(2013) noted 33 such land concessions covering 208,805 ha, and UNHRC 
(2012) highlighted five concessions in protected areas. 
METHODOLOGY
The methodology is based on a case study of the Botum Sakor National Park 
in Cambodia´s Koh Kong province as the study region. Established in 1993, 
the 171,250-ha Botum Sakor National Park is Cambodia´s largest national 
park. In recent years, the Cambodian government has reclassified large tracts 
of land into sustainable use zones and granted economic land concessions 
within the National Park to at least nine private companies for agro-industrial 
crop planting and eco-tourism, commercial development, water reservoirs, 
and hydropower dams (UNHRC 2012).
Koh Kong province is in the southwest and has a long, undeveloped 
coastline on the Gulf of Thailand and a mountainous, forested and largely 
inaccessible interior. The national parks, waterfalls, mangrove forests, islands 
and coral reefs have primarily been marketed as an eco-tourism destination 
in recent years. Koh Kong’s economy largely benefits from cross-border 
trade and the tourist industry. The livelihoods of most rural people depend 
on agriculture and the forest or on fisheries in coastal areas. The main crop is 
rice cultivated on more than 9,000 ha, followed by fruit and permanent crops 
grown on almost 7,000 ha (CDC 2015). The annual fish production is estimated 
to be 34,600 tonnes of saltwater fish and 11,000 tonnes of freshwater fish, 
followed by limited aquaculture (CDC 2015). According to the FAO (2011b), 
the fisheries communities of Koh Kong are slightly better off than others in the 
country due to more productive fishing grounds. 
The field data were collected in September 2014 by a team of nine 
development practitioners combining several qualitative methods: 10 focus 
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group discussions with 151 community members (54 percent of whom were 
women) conducted at each relocation site, 12 key informant interviews with 
selected government officials at provincial and district levels, including the 
provincial Vice-Governor and community leaders, service mapping (with geo-
tagging) of key basic services (e.g., health, education), community observations 
and five in-depth interviews with affected individuals. Additionally, a water 
sample from one randomly selected well was taken in March 2015 for a 
physical and chemical analysis conducted by the Industrial Laboratory Center 
of Cambodia in Phnom Penh.
The primary methodological approach of the field data collection was 
focus group discussion because of the qualitative rather than quantitative 
nature of the research. The research team used convenience sampling and 
attempted to include approximately 10 percent of the relocated families in the 
focus group discussions. The semi-structured discussion between focus group 
discussion participants provided the researchers with an opportunity to hear 
issues that may have not emerged from their individual interaction with the 
researchers. The interaction among the participants led to increased emphasis 
on the participants’ perspectives rather than those of the researchers and 
permitted discovery of aspects of understanding that often remained hidden in 
the more conventional in-depth interviewing method. As Liamputtong (2012) 
wrote, focus group discussion enables an examination of how and why people 
think the way they do about the issues that are important to them without 
pressuring them into making decisions or reaching a consensus. 
Key informant interviews and in-depth interviews were added to obtain 
additional perspectives and triangulate the data collected through other field 
work methods and desk research. 
To obtain a better understanding of the history and background of the 
Botum Sakor National Park economic land concession, the fieldwork data 
were supplemented with a review of a range of secondary sources: publicly 
available information from the Cambodian government, Cambodian English-
language media, the “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Cambodia, Surya P. Subedi. Addendum: A human rights 
analysis of economic and other land concessions in Cambodia” presented to 
United Nations Human Rights Council as well as reports from Cambodian 
national NGOs.  
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Kiri Sakor Peam Kay 15 6
Kiri Sakor Preak Smach 16 7
Kiri Sakor Kien Kralach 20 9
Kiri Sakor Tani 12 5
Kiri Sakor Pnhy Meas 23 14
Kiri Sakor Cham Lorng Kor 11 7
Botum Sakor Tanoun 18 9
Botum Sakor Bak Roneash 14 12
Botum Sakor Toul Por 7 6
Botum Sakor Preak Kjong 15 7
Total 151 82
The paper also relies on dozens of semi-structured interviews with key NGO 
workers that were conducted between 2011 and 2016 and helped inform our 
understanding of land grabbing in Cambodia; their information is described in 
the discussion section.
The methodology implies that this study has the following limitations: 
1. The description of the ex-ante situation of the relocated communities relies 
largely on the information reported by the people affected by the land 
concession and thus could contain several potential sources of bias because 
no independently verifiable baseline information on the situation, living 
conditions, livelihoods, and housing was available prior the relocations. 
2. As with other land concessions in Cambodia, there is a general lack of 
transparency and information surrounding this land concession. The data 
provided by the Cambodian government remain incomplete and are not easily 
accessible by the public. 
RESULTS
Granting of a Land Concession to UDG
In April 2008, 36,000 ha were excised from the Botum Sakor National Park 
and reclassified as state private land by Royal Decree (RGC 2005) and thus 
became eligible for long-term land concessions. One month later, a 99-year 
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lease contract was signed with UDG for the construction of a commercial 
development zone and resort to attract tourists and additional investment 
(UNHRC 2012; ADHOC 2012). This land covered a large portion of the coast 
in Kiri Sakor and Botum Sakor districts as well as 12 villages. Under the 
contract, UDG was authorised to develop infrastructure that would support 
the tourism sector, including casinos, condominiums, apartments and resorts, 
and to clear forest areas during the development (UNHRC 2012). However, 
villagers and some opposition politicians claimed in the Cambodia Daily:
... that large parts of the concession have been instead turned into 
plantations for cassava and palm oil trees (Crothers and Reaksmey 
2014). 
Map 1: Relocation sites in Botum Sakor and Kiri Sakor districts. 
The Cambodian government was made responsible for the administrative 
functions associated with relocation and compensation and UDG was to bear 
the costs of compensation and construction of the relocation site. In August 
2011, the government issued a sub-decree to reclassify an additional 9,100 
ha as a sustainable use zone and granted a second land concession to UDG 
to develop a water reservoir and hydropower plant (UNHRC 2012). The 
communities were relocated away from the coastal areas, although many of 
the communities depended on access to the Gulf of Thailand for their food and 
income. The villages affected by the land concession had been in existence for 
generationsthe community members are a mix of families who settled in the 
area before the Sihanouk regime in the 1960s (UNHRC 2012).
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According to Cambodian NGO ADHOC (2012), the affected 
communities were not consulted about the project and its potential impacts but 
only noticed company representatives and governmental officials travelling 
throughout their communes and measuring land before the contract was signed 
in 2008. Some people became aware that: 
... of this only when the company came to gradually clear, dismantle, and 
burn down their houses from the beginning of 2011… Though people 
filed complaints with the local authorities and relevant institutions at 
national level…, there has never been any proper resolution. 
The communities were reportedly officially informed of the project for the 
first time in November 2009 during a visit by government officials and UDG 
representatives (UNHRC 2012). They were informed that they were on state 
land and were therefore obligated to move. They were offered relocation 
(a single-family house at the relocation site approximately 20 km from the 
coast and the allocation of residential and farming land) and compensation, 
depending on the status of the land and the level of documentation that the 
household possessed (between USD250 and USD 8,000 per ha of farmland). 
Negotiations for compensation packages took place in 2010, and approximately 
1,000 families were relocated in 2011. Some families resisted relocation and 
continue to do so, and some of the villagers reported that they accepted the 
compensation under pressure, threat, or lack of information or alternatives 
(UNHRC, 2012). Crothers and Reaksmey (2014) quoted the NGO Forum in 
the Cambodia Daily that: 
...398 of the 1,963 affected families have yet to receive any 
compensation for loss of land. 
The resistance of the communities affected by the relocation was described by 
Touch and Neef (2015) using the land concession in Botum Sakor National 
Park as a case study. The villagers tried to challenge the actions of UDG and its 
high-level government backers through a combination of open and collective 
defiance, advocacy resistance, everyday politics and official resistance, albeit 
with limited success. In May 2010, approximately 200 families travelled to 
Phnom Penh to submit a complaint and call on the Prime Minister to intervene 
in the land dispute and redress the inadequate compensation packages. In 
December 2011, National Route 48 was blocked for eight hours by relocated 
families. In March 2012, community members travelled to Phnom Penh to 
participate in the ASEAN People’s Forum and submit a complaint to the 
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Chinese Embassy. They were briefly detained at the police commissariat 
and escorted back to their villages. In February 2014, UDG security guards, 
backed by soldiers, reportedly destroyed 44 houses in Tanoun and Koh Sdech 
communes, which resulted in a protest by 100 villagers who stayed outside the 
UDG offices for two days. Violence erupted again in November 2014 at UDG 
construction sites, where some defiant protesters remained. In two separate 
incidents, UDG security guards reportedly destroyed 17 houses of residents 
that had resisted relocation. 
Land Tenure Security, Housing and Sanitation at the Relocation Site
The relocation site is spread over 4,000 ha deep inside the Botum Sakor 
National Park, approximately 20 km from the coast. According to key informant 
interviews conducted, 1,412 families or 5,791 individuals had been relocated 
as of September 2014. However, according to focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews, some families later migrated from the relocation site, 
leaving an estimated 10–20 percent of the houses empty, as observed by the 
research team.
Based on the findings from key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions, relocated families were offered 0.5 ha of residential land with 
a 6.5 m by 7.5 m constructed wooden house and a two or three ha plot of 
farmland. Focus group discussion participants across all communities felt 
insecure with their land entitlement because the land is officially a protected 
area that has yet to be transformed into state private land so land titles can be 
issued to those affected. At the time of research, they did not possess the land 
tenure certificate for their farm lands, only a temporary title for the housing 
land. Many families reported during focus group discussions that the land 
provided was not usable for farming without heavy ground work to clear the 
forest, which they could not afford. Some families reported that their allocated 
farmland was as far as 5 to 6 km away from their house. It was reported during 
several focus group discussions that a few families had sold this allocated 
farm land because they needed the cash to feed their families. 
It was reported and confirmed by research team observations that the 
housing provided was of poor quality. Many villagers raised concerns about 
how it would cope in strong winds and other severe weather conditions. 
The field team observed that at least two houses had already collapsed 
during storms, according to information provided by the occupants of the 
neighbouring houses. The research team observed that approximately 30–40 
percent of the houses in the relocation villages were in poor condition, with 
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the roof, windows or walls partially removed by wind or rain. The team also 
documented incidences in which it was no longer possible to access the houses 
because large crevices had opened between the road and the property. Some 
families have installed makeshift bridges to overcome this, but others have 
abandoned their homes. A small minority of families had invested their own 
money into upgrading, extending or maintaining their houses. No electricity 
system reached the villages, so they relied on generators and car batteries. 
None of the houses provided included a sanitation facility, and although some 
people found the means to build them themselves or received assistance from 
the Provincial Department of Rural Development, an estimated 95 percent of 
households practiced open defecation. It was observed that, on average, the 
communities had approximately 5 to 6 latrines.
During the semi-structured interview, the provincial Vice-Governor 
acknowledged that the living conditions of the displaced communities were 
worse after the move than before.
Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods 
One of the most significant challenges reported during the focus group 
discussions and in-depth interviews was the change in livelihoods and income-
generation opportunities resulting in negative impacts on food security and 
nutrition. Many families, such as that of 32-year-old Sao Buntheat with two 
children, had relied on fishing and farming low-lying agricultural lands in 
coastal areas and were often unable to continue these activities once relocated. 
Focus group discussion participants from all villages unanimously 
agreed that there has been a significant shift in the types of food they eat 
since the relocation. The mere distance from coastal areas has had a reported 
negative impact on dietary diversity. Previously, they were eating rice, fish, 
seafood and vegetables that they caught or produced themselves. In the low-
lying coastal areas, many villagers had their own small gardens and grew a 
range of vegetables, farming rice, with a reported production of over three 
tons of rice per season per household, and corn and catching fish, meaning 
that they had relatively plentiful access to diverse food. Since the relocation, 
only a limited number of villagers have established home gardens, and they 
no longer produce rice. Fish has been substituted in some peoples’ diets with 
meat bought infrequently from the market. 
Since the relocation, most families have shifted from subsistence 
economic activities—largely producing their own foodto certain degree of 
market dependency that has had negative effects on the households’ budgets; 
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villagers need to spend more buying food than prior to relocation. Some 
focus group discussion participants reported that they had a shortage of food 
during certain periods because they had no money. Despite the challenges of 
accessing a variety of food stuffs, they did not report any signs or symptoms 
related to malnutrition such as stunting or wasting in children and these were 
not observed by the research team during their time spent in the communities.
The focus group discussions were unanimous that their current 
livelihood activities could not provide the same level of income as previously 
(which some reported to be as high as USD10–15 /day). Ms. Thoeun Khorn, 
for instance, whose family was relocated from Preak Kjong village to Tanoun 
commune told the researchers that before relocation her family produced 3 
tonnes of rice per season and corn and other crops year round but: 
... has been unable to utilise the agricultural land provided as part of the 
compensation package from the company due to its being hilly and forested. 
As many as 20 percent of the focus group discussion participants’ households 
found work as hired labour with UDG, which paid USD150/month. Some 
Tanoun villagers who worked as golf caddies and hotel cleaning staff 
reported earning as much as USD200/month. However, many of them raised 
concerns about their long-term job security. Other existing income-generation 
opportunities at the relocation site were irregular as noted in focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, in-depth interviews and research 
team observations; they included selling unskilled labour in the community, 
small-scale enterprise activities such as grocery shops or recycling, forest-
related livelihoods, including the illegal harvesting of forest trees for house 
construction and producing charcoal, and income-generation activities linked 
to collection of non-timber forest products such as rattan, mushrooms, herbs 
and honey. Forty-nine-year-old Mr. Sok Phan, living with his wife and four 
children, reported that he could only find very low and irregular income 
from collecting non-timber forest products and his unskilled labour. He was 
considering migration to another area to meet the family’s needs.
Respondents agreed that many of the community members continue to 
fish and that it remains their primary source of income. However, they noted 
that there were additional costs associated with this because they had to travel 
using roads that were in poor condition. Some of the fishing families did not 
regularly stay at the relocation site and have returned to their old villages to 
stay with their former fellow community members who resisted relocation 
or have set up a temporary shelter to fish. Due to the difficulty in securing 
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livelihoods, it was often seen as necessary for children to participate in such 
livelihood activities, in lieu of attending school.
Participants identified potential opportunities for new, alternative 
livelihoods (animal husbandry or farming cash crops such as cassava, cashew, 
jackfruit, mango, aromatic culinary herbs, and pineapple) but they often felt 
they lacked the necessary technical skills or start-up capital required. 
After the relocation, many families found it difficult to support 
themselves and consequently had to spend their savings and survive on the 
dwindling financial compensation they received. They estimated that the 
number of families indebted with micro-financial institutions2 was 10 percent 
in Tani, over 50 percent in Pnhy Meas, 60–80 percent in Peam Kay, 70–100 
percent in Toul Por, 99 percent in Tanoun and 100 percent in Cham Lorng 
Kor and that their ability to repay was uncertain, given the lack of income-
generating opportunities.  
Access to and Quality of Basic Services and Water
In some villages, the roads are worn away by rain or flood water, making 
transportation between and within villages very challenging. At least two 
areas visited by the research team were passable only by a four-wheel drive 
vehicle or on foot. 
During discussions and interviews, community members identified 
the poor state of the roads and the associated high cost of transportation as 
a significant barrier to accessing health care services. No new health care 
facilities were constructed as part of the relocation, and residents must travel 
to health care facilities outside the relocation areas, i.e., a health post in Preak 
Smach and health centres in Thmor Sar, which is reportedly often closed, and 
Koh Sdeach, both of which are more than 20 km from most of the relocation 
villages. Moreover, the health centre in Koh Sdeach is located on King Island, 
off the west coast of Kiri Sakor, and getting there requires a 15-minute boat 
crossing that can be dangerous or impossible during bad weather. The physical 
condition of these health facilities was found to be inadequate when visited by 
the research team. The health post in Preak Smach is in a converted house that 
was in a dilapidated state with virtually no equipment, supplies or material. 
At the time of the research team visit, the post was unstaffed, overgrown with 
grass and appeared to have been unused for some time. Focus group discussion 
participants also commented negatively on frequently absent health workers, 
particularly at this health post. Two-months-pregnant Ms. Thoeun Khorn 
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planned to go to Thmor Sar commune for antenatal care and delivery, which is 
approximately 30 km from her new home.
One-hundred-fifty water sources, open and tube wells, were constructed, 
mostly by UDG according to findings from key informant interviews. 
Additional wells have been added in some communities, e.g., in Preak Kjong, 
as observed by the research team. However, focus group discussions stressed 
that access to drinking water remained a challenge, especially during the driest 
months of March and April when the wells dried up and families had to travel 
400 to 500 m to fetch water from streams or other available sources. It was 
observed by the research team that only 5 wells serve a community of 79 
families in Tanoun. Some people in the focus group discussions mentioned 
that they did not consider the water potable because of its strong metallic and 
mineral taste, which was confirmed by the research team. Rain water or river 
water were thus preferred drinking water sources. The water test conducted 
in March 2015 from one of the randomly selected wells in Tanoun village 
showed that the water did not meet national standards for drinking water in at 
least four characteristics: Ph 5.58 (the standard is 6.5–8.5), Fe 8.68 mg/L (the 
standard less than 0.3 mg/L), NO2 22 mg/L (the standard less than 3 mg/L) and 
turbidity 57 NTU (the standard less than 5 NTU).
The educational infrastructure varied greatly by community, from brand 
new, not yet open schools with sanitation and other facilities to run-down 
wooden structures that required repair to no schools within easy walking 
distance. Four schools were constructed by UDG and two more buildings 
were constructed by NGOs. According to Mr. Sien Sok Ry, the principal of 
Peam Kay School, there were only two wooden school rooms in the village 
but the school must accommodate more than 150 children from grades 1 to 6. 
Whereas most people in the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews 
felt that the access and quality of education has worsened compared to the 
pre-relocation situation, one community reported that because they were now 
closer to a school, it was thus easier for their children to attend than before 
the relocation. In the case of another village, the nearest primary school was 
reportedly 8 km away. In most cases, children had to travel 2–3 km to reach a 
school, often walking along dangerous roads and through flooded areas. The 
research team observed that the sanitation facilities were not functioning in 
Peam Kay School and that there was no water available. 
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BOTUM SAKOR CASE STUDY IN RELATION TO OTHER 
ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS IN RURAL CAMBODIA
The economic land concessions in Cambodia suffer from a lack of free, prior 
and informed consent of affected land-users. The case study of Kiri Sakor 
and Botum Sakor districts confirmed the findings documented in Srae Ambel 
district by Haakansson et al. (2011) and by Neef et al. (2013) for several land 
concessions in Kratie province. 
In terms of compensation, the affected communities in the Kiri Sakor 
and Botum Sakor districts received 0.5 ha of housing land with a built house, 
2 to 3 ha of farm land (though forested and without legal title) and financial 
compensation of USD250 to USD8,000 per ha of farmland. They were 
relatively better treated than others in Cambodia. Borras and Franco (2011) 
documented the land concession in Omlaing commune in Kampong Speu 
province where: 
Each household was given USD25 disturbance compensation and 
dumped in a resettlement location lacking in both infrastructure and 
suitable farming potential… Most of the villagers who had farms 
inside the contested land and who had been settled there for a long 
time were offered USD100 per hectare compensation for the irrigated 
rice lands. 
Chev et al. (2011) reported that in Choam Sangke commune of the same 
province, 35 percent of households were granted less than 0.5 ha, 16.7 
percent were granted 0.5 to 1 ha, 18 percent were granted more than 1 ha and 
10 percent were evicted without any compensation. All of the families had to 
rebuild housing at their cost. Prachvuthy (2011) documented in Mondulkiri 
province that:
Compensation has been USD200 per hectare depending on the family, 
with families… of village chiefs or local authorities, receiving better 
compensation. 
In the case of Srae Ambel district, the farmers were offered only “a small 
compensation” for the loss of crops, not the value of the land, because the 
farmers did not possess land titles (Haakansson et al. 2011).
The 20 percent of people who found work with the investor in the Botum 
Sakor National Park land concession is relatively high compared to other land 
concessions in Cambodia and at USD150–200/month they also earn much 
more than is common elsewhere. However, there are still concerns in the 
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affected communities of Botum Sakor about how long the job opportunities 
with UDG will remain available. Chev et al. (2011) reports that in Choam 
Sangke commune in Kampong Speu province, only 9 percent of people found 
work with the investor in 2006 and that the number decreased every year to 
2 percent in 2010, earning USD1.5/day. Moreover, the work was seasonal 
and lasted only 2 to 3 months. In the case of the Srae Ambel district land 
concession: 
Some people who lost all their land have had no choice but to work 
on the plantations. The pay is low and the work is irregular. When 
working at the Ly Young Pat’s sugar plantation (one) can earn EUR1.7 
per day, but (one) will only have work 3–4 months a year (Haakansson 
et al. 2011). 
The Guardian reported from the Koh Kong sugar plantation that many villagers 
seek work from the very company they are now suing in British courts for 
evicting them (Hodal 2013).
Indigenous people affected by land concessions in Ratanakiri and 
Mondulkiri provinces interviewed by Prachvuthy (2011): 
... agreed that companies had provided employment, albeit limitedthey 
observed that companies prefer hiring in-migrant workers to hiring 
indigenous people, as the former are more productive and agree to 
lower wages. 
The initial wage per day was approximately USD5 but a few months later, 
after bringing in outside workers, this decreased to USD3.65. Interestingly, in 
the case of the Botum Sakor National Park land concession, strong resentment 
against working for the company responsible for the eviction was not 
observed, unlike that observed by Neef et al. (2013) in Kratie province, where 
villagers reiterated their strong determination that they would not work for the 
concessionaire. During interviews with indigenous people affected by land 
concessions in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces, Prachvuthy (2011) found 
that 76 percent of the respondents were unwilling to work for the concession 
company because the work was hard “with no freedom” and the: 
... lack of experience with wage labour… made working on a plantation 
hard for them, particularly as workers have to get up very early to 
travel to work and have limited time for lunch…, and too angry with 
the company for taking their land and destroying their spirit forests…; 
58-year old man said that I and my generation will not work for those 
concession companies even if we are starving.
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As was the case in other land concessions in Cambodia, the relocation of 
affected Botum Sakor National Park communities had disastrous effects on 
their livelihoods, income-generation opportunities and food security. In Srae 
Ambel district: 
... food insecurity has increased as farmers have lost valuable farmland, 
grazing land and access to the forest. Affected farmers can no longer 
grow enough food to sustain their families. Poverty has risen in the 
area because the farmers have no more or little land left to cultivate 
(Haakansson et al. 2011). 
People in Botum Sakor and Kiri Sakor districts who want to continue their 
original livelihoodsfishingmust travel 20 km (or stay illegally in basic 
shelters close to the sea). As with the indigenous people of Ratanakiri and 
Mondulkiri provinces, some families had to travel 20–35 km to collect non-
timber forest products, their source of livelihoods, after the land concessions 
were awarded (Prachvuthy 2011). Interestingly, non-timber forest products 
and timber or firewood have been identified as a potential source of livelihoods 
and income for the relocated people of Botum Sakor and Kiri Sakor districts 
whereas in other documented cases, land concessions meant that people lost 
this opportunity or that it became more difficult for them (see Chev et al. 
2011 for Choam Sangke commune in Kampong Speu province, Prachvuthy, 
2011 for Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces and Neef et al. 2013 for Kbal 
Damrey commune, Kratie province). Families in the Botum Sakor National 
Park are indebted with various micro-credit schemes and face difficulties 
in repaying loans due to the loss of income sources, as documented in Srae 
Ambel district (Haakansson et al. 2011). There is increased pressure to keep 
children out of school in the relocation areas of the Botum Sakor National 
Park to help with income-generation for the family, as observed in Srae Ambel 
district (Haakansson et al. 2011) or the Guardian who interviewed 38-year-old 
mother Chea Sok, who was affected by the sugar plantation concession:
I had to pull my kids out of school and send them to work on the 
plantation after they took our land away because we couldn’t afford to 
eat (Hodal 2013). 
Except for one village where it is easier for children to attend school than 
before the relocation, the public infrastructure and access to basic services has 
worsened in the Botum Sakor National Park. Conversely, Prachvuthy (2011) 
recorded that in Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri provinces:
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...companies had helped improve infrastructure in indigenous 
communities, through road, school and health centre construction.
Interestingly, although the investors or Cambodian government should be 
responsible for building public infrastructure at the relocation sites, NGOs 
sometimes stepped in. An NGO worker whose organisation started building 
health clinic and sanitation facilities in the relocation areas of Botum Sakor 
and Kiri Sakor districts told us:
UDG has given money to the government to build decent infrastructure 
in the relocation sites but the infrastructure has either not been built or 
has been built in very poor quality. We acknowledge that it is wrong 
and not very systematic to substitute the government but if we do not 
do it, no one will and lives of people will remain miserable.
UDG, through Mr. Wang Chao, its Communication Manager, confirmed in 
April 2015 that the issues of compensation and relocation are to be handled by 
the government:
UDG does not have the technical ability to solve these problems, 
company still lacks the capacity to solve the community issues because 
we have never done it before. The government is taking care of the 
relocation issues and promised to compensate those living legally in 
the area, and evict those who were living there illegally. We financially 
supported this, but the company cannot identify who is legal or not, 
and leaves that to the government.
CONCLUSION
This research was, as Scoones et al. (2013) described in their article, rather 
“quick and dirty” and involved a short fact-finding mission and rapid 
assessment. Some of the methods used, especially focus group discussions and 
observation, could have been influenced by the stances of those who facilitated 
the discussions or provided the observation data, by people who come from 
the INGO/UN background. Long-term, in-depth academic research using 
quantitative methods with established baselines, counterfactuals, comparative 
frames and careful sampling is necessary for more credible and authoritative 
data and analysis. 
It will be important to see whether relocated people obtain land titles 
for the new lands because this could improve tenure security for some of 
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them. The question also remains whether the affected people will be able to 
keep their jobs with the land concession project after it is developed. Further 
research might be needed to determine whether the selection of sites for the 
relocation inside the national park has led to further negative environmental 
impacts because the forest required clearing for the relocation sites and the 
influx of people will likely increase the number of incidents of forest clearing, 
poaching and environmental pollution in this environmentally sensitive area. 
We conclude that there is clear evidence that most of those affected by 
the Botum Sakor National Park land concessions are worse off than before the 
relocation and will likely remain so in the short- to medium-term. However, 
as the coastal waters of Koh Kong are depleted by overfishing, switching to 
alternative livelihoodsif people are provided with necessary skills and start-
up financial supportmight represent an opportunity for sustainable long-
term food and income security for those affected. Determining if this is the 
case would require further multidisciplinary research.
NOTES
∗ Petr Drbohlav has more than 13 years of professional experience as development 
practitioner in Asia and Africa. He obtained his PhD in Sustainable Rural Development 
at the Faculty of AgriSciences, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, focusing his 
research on land tenure, land grabbing and land reform in Southeast Asia. He possesses 
an MA in International Relations from University of Economics, Prague. His scientific 
interest and publications also focus on biogas technology in developing countries and 
development in general.
∗∗ Jiří Hejkrlík, PhD, is lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Tropical AgriSciences, 
Czech University of Life Sciences Prague. His field of research and teaching is related 
to agricultural and development economics. Current development and research project 
activities cover especially former socialists and post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.
1 In Cambodia, there is also a mechanism of so-called social land concessions intended 
as a redistribution of state-owned land to poor, land-less people. When referring to 
land concessions in this paper, unless otherwise stated, economic land concessions are 
meant.
2 Unfortunately, the research team was not able to determine what percentage of families 
took a loan from micro-financial institutions prior to the relocation, if the percentage 
has increased or if families took additional loans because of the relocation.
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